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Background Pigs are mixing vessels for influenza viral
reassortment, but the extent of influenza transmission between
swine and humans is not well understood.
Objectives To assess whether occupational exposure to pigs is a
risk factor for human infection with human and swine-adapted
influenza viruses.
Methods UK pig industry workers were frequency-matched on
age, region, sampling month, and gender with a community-based
comparison group from the Flu Watch study. HI assays quantified
antibodies for swine and human A(H1) and A(H3) influenza viruses
(titres ≥ 40 considered seropositive and indicative of infection).
Virus-specific associations between seropositivity and occupational
pig exposure were examined using multivariable regression models
adjusted for vaccination. Pigs on the same farms were also tested for
seropositivity.
Results Forty-two percent of pigs were seropositive to A(H1N1)
pdm09. Pig industry workers showed evidence of increased odds of
A(H1N1)pdm09 seropositivity compared to the comparison group,
albeit with wide confidence intervals (CIs), adjusted odds ratio after
accounting for possible cross-reactivity with other swine A(H1)
viruses (aOR) 253, 95% CI (14–5363), P = 0028.
Conclusion The results indicate that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was
common in UK pigs during the pandemic and subsequent period of
human A(H1N1)pdm09 circulation, and occupational exposure to
pigs was a risk factor for human infection. Influenza immunisation
of pig industry workers may reduce transmission and the potential
for virus reassortment.
Keywords Humans, influenza, occupational exposure, serology,
swine, zoonoses.
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Introduction
Influenza A viruses can cause significant morbidity and
mortality in humans and other animal species and show a
high degree of genomic variability and adaptability. They are
categorised by subtype based on their main surface glyco-
proteins, haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA),
which determine a range of key properties including
antigenicity. Human-adapted viruses in the past century
have been those expressing HA subtypes 1, 2, and 3 and NA
subtypes 1 and 2. Since 1968, only the A(H1N1) and A
(H3N2) subtypes have circulated widely in humans.1 Obser-
vations over the past 40–50 years have documented subtypes
of viruses A(H1N1), A(H1N2) and A(H3N2) circulating in
pigs worldwide and strain variations between Europe, North
America and Asia have been noted.2 In the UK, A(H1N2)
was the most commonly observed swine subtype in a large
pig serosurvey conducted between 2008–2009.3 Between 1998
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and 2009, an avian-like H1N1 strain most commonly and an
H1N2 strain were regularly detected in UK pigs.4,5 The A
(H1N1)pdm09 virus was detected in pig herds from autumn
2009,6 although it may have been first transmitted to pigs
from humans several months earlier.7
Influenza viruses bind to host cell surface receptors with a
terminal sialic acid (SA), different versions of which are
present in different animal species forming the basis of host-
strain specificity.8,9 Avian strains preferentially bind to SA
a2,3-Gal (prevalent in avian species) while human virus
strains require SA a2,6-Gal receptors (dominant in humans).
The relatively poor fit of avian viruses to human and other
non-avian hosts is thought to limit the potential emergence
of novel strains10 Pigs (and many other species) express both
types of receptors such that they could be potentially
susceptible to both avian and human viruses.
Co-infection of a single host with two different strains of
the influenza virus provides an opportunity for genetic
reassortment (rearrangements and altered combinations of
genome segments), which could lead to sudden and
marked changes (antigenic shift) and the emergence of
novel strains or subtypes expressing new surface antigen
proteins that the host might have little or no immunity
against. Should the newly acquired properties of such a
novel strain make it transmissible in humans, then it would
have the potential to start a pandemic. Pigs are a
particularly important species in this regard as the occur-
rence of both types of SA receptors permits binding of
human and avian influenza viruses making them an
efficient ‘mixing vessel’.11–14 Interspecies transmission (in
both directions) of swine and human influenza viruses is
well recognised, evidenced by the isolation of human
influenza virus in swine15,16 and evidence of swine
influenza virus (SIV) infection in people with close
occupational17–19 and/or residential proximity to pigs20,21;
or prolonged exposure at an agricultural fair22. Transmis-
sion between pigs and bird species is exemplified by various
reports of isolation of SIV from turkeys.23–25 The 2009
pandemic virus A(H1N1)pdm09 comprised genetic com-
ponents from the swine-adapted North American triple
reassortant H3N2 viruses and a Eurasian swine virus.26
There is an increasing need for monitoring transmission
between pigs and humans, but data on the extent of such
transmission events remains limited. Previous studies
attempting to assess serological evidence of swine influenza
in people with occupational exposure to pigs all recruited
their non-pig-exposed comparison groups from restricted
groups such as blood donors,18,27–29 students, teachers, or
university or hospital personnel,30–32 or in some cases, they
used serum bank samples.17,33 This study focused on
assessing SIV infection in pig industry workers in England
during the emergence of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Serological
data on SIV infection in pig veterinarians and pig farm
workers was compared with a sample from the general
population, and related to serology from sampled pigs in
contact with the pig farm workers.
Methods
Recruitment and specimen collection
We recruited pig industry workers including pig farm
workers and specialist pig veterinarians (each veterinarian
typically attended a number of different farms across an
area, and some also worked in other settings such as
abattoirs). Pig veterinarians were recruited at November
2009 and May 2010 meetings of the Pig Veterinary Society,
a species specialist group of the British Veterinary Associ-
ation. Pig farm workers were recruited from 17 farms in
September–December 2010 from a large group of farrow-to-
finish pig farms that participated in a related study of SIV
infection in English pigs.3 Farms came from two main
clusters in North Yorkshire and East Anglia, both regions
with higher densities of the pig population.34 Farm owners
were first asked for permission to approach their staff,
including everyone with direct pig contact such as farm
hands, on-site managers, and field maintenance workers. At
the farms where owners granted permission, pig farm
workers were invited to join the study. At the same time
blood samples were collected from pigs from each of the
worker’s farms.
Participants from the concurrent Flu Watch study – a
community-level, household-based cohort study of influenza
in England35 – formed the population comparison group. Flu
Watch participants were frequency-matched to pig industry
workers on age group, geographic region, calendar month of
blood sample, and gender (in decreasing priority order).
All participants gave individual written informed consent,
and completed a questionnaire including information on
demographic characteristics and their history of influenza
vaccination for that season (2009 for pig veterinarians or
2010 for pig farm workers). Blood samples were collected
from all participants for serological analysis.
To examine the association between SIV infection among
pig farm workers and SIV infection among the pigs they
worked with, blood specimens were obtained from a sample
of pigs on their farms as part of the aforementioned SIV
infection study.3 Blood specimens were taken from pigs
during the same season as the pig farm workers (autumn
2010).
Influenza virus panel and laboratory methods
Serum samples from pig industry workers and the Flu Watch
population comparison group were tested for the presence of
antibodies using an AHVLA standard panel of SIVs repre-
sentative of contemporary viruses detected through routine
SIV surveillance in UK pigs, and known human viruses5 (see
Fragaszy et al.
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Table S1). The SIVs in the panel were A/sw/England/117316/
86 classical H1N1 (classical swine H1N1); A/sw/England/
195852/92 avian-like H1N1 (swine avian-like H1N1); A/sw/
England/163266/87 H3N2 (swine H3N2 87); and A/sw/
England/438207/94 H1N2 [swine H1N2]. The human viruses
were A/England/195/09 pH1N1 [A(H1N1)pdm09]; A/Bris-
bane/59/07 H1N1 (H1N1 07); and A/Perth/16/09 H3N2
(H3N2 Perth). Standard haemagglutination inhibition (HI)
assays36 were used. A reciprocal antibody titre of ≥40 (1:40
from serial dilution) was considered seropositive and taken
as indicative of putative previous infection with the corre-
sponding virus in humans.
Sera from unvaccinated pigs were tested for a smaller
subset of viruses [classical swine H1N1, swine H1N2, swine
H3N2 87, swine avian-like H1N1, and A(H1N1)pdm09]. It is
recognised that in HI tests with pig sera, the profile against
the range of viruses used needs to be analysed and
interpreted with care, as homosubtypic cross-reactive anti-
bodies to the HA may be detected without inferring exposure
to a particular strain. Difficulties in swine HI serology
interpretation can be compounded further by anti NA
(especially N2) antibodies interfering in the HI test. Our
approach was to evaluate the titres to determine those of the
greatest magnitude correlating with the most probable virus
subtype an individual animal had been exposed to. Within a
subtype, if the highest titre was ≥40 then the pig was
considered seropositive for that strain. If two strains within a
subtype shared the highest titre (≥40) then the pig was
considered seropositive for both; although it should also be
noted that a single animal may have been exposed to more
than one influenza virus.
Given that most farms had 12–16 pigs tested, we
considered a farm positive for a given strain if it had at
least three pigs seropositive for that strain.
Statistical analysis
We explored whether occupational exposure to pigs was
associated with infection with each virus strain through
univariable analysis using chi-square (v2) and Fisher’s exact
tests. We then built separate multivariable logistic regression
models for each virus strain to estimate the association of
occupational exposure to pigs and infection. These models
accounted for clustering for repeated measurements as some
participants contributed more than one sample from differ-
ent time periods. In each model we investigated the potential
confounding effects of vaccination status, age, season (winter
2009, spring 2010, autumn/winter 2010), geographic region
and gender. A variable was retained in the model if it was
associated with occupational pig exposure, associated with
infection, and either independently predicted the outcome or
else made an appreciable difference on the effect of
occupational pig exposure on infection. We hypothesised, a
priori, that the season of the blood sample may modify the
effect of occupational pig exposure on infection and this was
explored by testing for interaction terms in the models.
Where an influenza strain was found to be associated with
occupational pig exposure, we investigated the possibility of
cross-reactivity between that strain and other swine viruses
sharing the same haemagglutinin using cross-tabulations
with chi-square or Fisher’s exact test as appropriate. Where
there was evidence of association these strains were forced
into regression models to account for possible cross-
reactivity.
We conducted subanalyses among pig veterinarians pro-
viding more than one blood sample (November 2009 and
May 2010) to calculate the risk of seroconversion to each
virus strain, as determined by a fourfold rise in antibody
titre.
In a series of subanalyses (one for each strain of SIV tested
in both pigs and humans), we explored whether pig farm
workers’ SIV seropositivity status was associated with the
positivity status of their farm’s pig herd using chi-square and
Fisher’s exact tests.
Ethics
This study was approved by the Cambridgeshire-1 Research
Ethics Committee (REC) Reference 10/H0304/4. The Flu
Watch study, from which the population comparison group
was drawn, was approved by the Oxfordshire REC Reference
06/Q104/103. Participants received full information about
the study and if interested and eligible, they were enrolled
after providing fully informed written consent.
Results
Participants and blood samples
The characteristics of participants and number of blood
samples are described in Table 1. A total of 26 pig
veterinarians participated in the study, providing 42 separate
blood samples, with 16 veterinarians contributing two
samples (one from November 2009 and one from May
2010). An additional 29 pig farmers from 17 different pig
farms participated in the study, each contributing one blood
sample. A total of 68 Flu Watch participants provided 71
blood samples which were frequency-matched to the samples
from the pig industry workers as described in the methods.
Sixty-five of the Flu Watch participants contributed only one
blood sample but three contributed two blood samples from
two of the three possible seasons (winter 2009, spring 2010 or
winter 2010). Most pig industry workers were male. The
median age for pig industry workers and the frequency-
matched Flu Watch participants was 44 and 47 respectively.
At the time the blood sample was taken, 93% of participants
were unvaccinated. Only five Flu Watch participants and
four pig farmers had received the currently available
pandemic vaccine.
Influenza infection in UK pig industry workers
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Risk of infection in relation to occupational
exposure to pigs
In the univariable analysis (Table 2), there was evidence that
antibodies to three out of the eight influenza strains were
more common in pig industry workers than the population
comparison group: A(H1N1)pdm09 (23% versus 4%,
P = 0001); swine H1N2 (24% versus 11%, P = 0047) and
H3N2 Perth (37% versus 20%, P = 0025).
There was no evidence of swine avian-like H1N1
antibodies in the population comparison group in contrast
to three seropositive pig industry workers (4%). Although
10% of pig industry workers and 4% of the comparison
group had antibodies to classical swine H1N1, these reactions
were most probably due to cross-reactive antibodies from an
A(H1N1)pdm09 infection as the classical swine H1N1 strain
had not circulated in the UK for decades and 70% of those
seropositive for the virus were also seropositive for A(H1N1)
pdm09. Antibodies to swine A(H1N2 or H3N2) strains were
relatively common in both groups (range 11–64%).
In the multivariable analysis (Table 2), after adjusting for
confounders, there was strong evidence that pig industry
workers had elevated odds of A(H1N1)pdm09 seropositivity
[adjusted odds ratio (aOR) = 204, 95% confidence interval
(CI) (22–1864), P = 0007] compared to the Flu watch
comparator population. We found strong evidence that A
(H1N1)pdm09 seropositivity in humans was associated with
seropositivity to swine H1N2 (P = 0003), classical swine
H1N1 (P < 0001) and swine avian-like H1N1 (P = 0002).
The association between A(H1N1)pdm09 seropositivity and
occupational swine exposure remained strong after control-
ling for the possible effect of cross-reactivity with these
strains [aOR = 151, 95% CI (16–140), P = 0017].
Pig industry workers had an increased odds of swine
H1N2 seropositivity [aOR = 43 (95% CI 14–135),
P = 0012] compared to the population group. There was
strong evidence that seropositivity was associated with A
(H1N1)pdm09 (P = 0003) and classical swine H1N1
(P < 0001) but less evidence of an association with avian-
like swine H1N1 (P = 0080). The odds ratio remained
elevated after controlling for the possible effect of cross-
reactivity with these strains [aOR = 39, 95% CI (12–129),
P = 0025].
Pig industry workers also had an increased odds of H3N2
Perth seropositivity [aOR = 38, 95% CI (15–94),
P = 0004] compared to Flu Watch participants. We found
limited evidence of an association between the Perth and the
swine H3N2 87 strain (P = 0087) and strong association
with the swine H1N2 strain (P = 0001). After controlling for
possible cross-reactivity with these strains the odds ratio
remained elevated [aOR = 42, 95% CI (135–139),
P = 0018]. As H3N2 influenza strains have not circulated
in UK pigs since 1997, we examined this association
Table 1. Participant characteristics and numbers of samples
Participant characteristics
Flu watch Pig industry workers
No. people
(N = 68)* %
No. blood
samples
(N = 71)* %
No. people
(N = 55)* %
No. blood
samples
(N = 71)* %
Age group
<45 29 43 30 42 28 51 36 51
45–64 34 50 36 51 23 42 31 44
65+ 5 7 5 7 4 7 4 6
Gender
Male 55 81 57 80 45 82 57 80
Female 13 19 14 20 10 18 14 20
Region in England
East Midlands 30 44 31 44 21 38 31 44
North East 17 25 18 25 16 29 18 25
London and SE 14 21 14 20 11 20 14 20
West 7 10 8 11 7 13 8 11
Influenza vaccination
No 63 93 65 92 51 93 67 94
Yes 5 7 6 8 4 7 4 6
Pig industry worker type
Veterinarian N/A – N/A – 26 47 42 59
Farmer N/A – N/A – 29 53 29 41
*Number of people differ from number of blood samples as some individuals provide blood samples for more than one season.
Fragaszy et al.
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Table 2. Crude risk and adjusted odds of influenza infection comparing pig industry workers to a sample from a general population cohort (flu watch)
Typical host Strain
Univariable analysis
Multivariable regression analysisFlu watch Pig industry worker
P-value
N
No. positive
(no. of
these who
were
vaccinated) % Pos N
No.
positive
(no. of
these
who were
vaccinated) % Pos Chi2
Adjusted OR
(95% CI) pig
industry worker
versus flu watch P-value Model covariates***
Swine A/sw/England/117316/86
classical H1N1
(classical swine H1N1)
71 3 (2) 4 71 7 (3) 10 0326** 47 (081–2790) 0085 Vaccination
A/sw/England/195852/92
avian-like H1N1
(swine avian-like H1N1)
71 0 (0) 0 71 3 (1) 4 0245** —
A/sw/England/163266/87
H3N2* (swine H3N2 87)
53 34 (3) 64 53 28 (4) 53 0237 076 (033–177) 0522 Sex, season, age group
A/sw/England/438207/94
H1N2 (swine H1N2)
71 8 (2) 11 71 17 (4) 24 0047 432 (139–1346) 0012 Vaccination, season
Controlled for possible
cross-reactivity†
391 (119–1287), 0025 As above+†
Swine and
human
A/England/195/09 pH1N1
[A(H1N1)pdm09]
71 3 (2) 4 71 16 (4) 23 0002** 2044 (224–18640) 0007 Vaccination
Controlled for possible
cross-reactivity††
1511 (164–13975) 0017 As above +††
Human A/Brisbane/59/07 H1N1
(H1N1 07)
71 15 (4) 21 71 15 (3) 21 1 111 (045–274) 022 Vaccination
A/Perth/16/09 H3N2
(H3N2 Perth)
71 14 (3) 20 71 26 (4) 37 0025 377 (152–935) 0004 Vaccination, season
Controlled for possible
cross-reactivity†††
37 9 (2) 24 30 5 (0) 17 0443 422 (128–1394) 0018 As above+†††
*Limited to 106 samples with H3N2 87 readings.
**Fisher’s exact test P-value.
***Possible covariates include age group, gender, region, season and vaccination status.
†Controlled for seropositivity to for classical swine H1N1, swine avian-like H1N1, A(H1N1)pdm09.
††Controlled for seropositivity to classical swine H1N1, swine avian-like H1N1 or swine H1N2.
†††Controlled for seropositivity to H3N2 87 and swine H1N2.
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separately in those who were aged <18 years in 1997
(<30 years at the time of the study) and those who were
aged over 18 years in 1997 (30 years or over at the time of
the study). We found no association between pig worker
occupation and H3N2 Perth in the younger age group [aOR
05, 95% CI (00–161), P = 0696], but a strong association
in the older group [aOR 60, 95% CI (15–229), P = 001].
There was no evidence to suggest that occupational pig
exposure increased the odds of seropositivity to the other
influenza strains tested.
There was no evidence that season modified the associ-
ation between occupational exposure to pigs and seroposi-
tivity to any of the remaining viruses tested.
Seroconversion among pig veterinarians
Five of the 16 pig veterinarians with repeat samples
seroconverted to one or more strains tested and none had
received influenza vaccination between blood samples. One
veterinarian seroconverted to four different viruses [human
H1N1 07, A(H1N1)pdm09 and swine H3N2 87] while
another veterinarian seroconverted to both human H1N1 07
and A(H1N1)pdm09. The other three veterinarians either
converted to human H3N2 Perth or swine H1N2.
Pig serology and farm-level seroprevalence
Serology results for pigs were linked for 14 of 17 farms
(corresponding to 214 pigs in contact with 25 pig farm
workers). Pig- and Farm-level seroprevalence is reported in
Table 3. Farm-level positivity for a strain meant at least three
seropositive pigs for that strain on the farm. After accounting
for possible homosubtypic cross-reactive antibodies in the
three A(H1) strains tested in pigs, we found that 41% of pigs
were seropositive to A(H1N1)pdm09 and 79% of farms were
considered positive for the strain. In contrast, only 3–5% of
pigs were positive for classical swine H1N1, swine avian-like
H1N1 and swine H3N2 87. No farms were positive for either
swine H1N1 strains and only one farm was positive for swine
H3N2 87.
Farm-level seroprevalence and human infection
There was no evidence of an association between farm
positivity and risk of infection among pig farm workers for
any of the strains tested. All pig farm workers infected with
the pandemic virus worked on a farm positive for the same
strain. No pig farm workers were infected with swine avian-
like H1N1 (Table 4).
Discussion
This study improves our understanding of swine influenza
transmission to humans, by comparing the serological
evidence of SIV seropositivity in pig industry workers in
England with a general population-based comparison group
at the time of the A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza pandemic.
The key finding is that, in the period of this study, pig
industry workers had increased odds of influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 seropositivity compared to the general population.
Evidence of the association remained after controlling for
seropositivity to other swine H1 viruses, and is thus unlikely
to be the result of cross-reactivity. We also found evidence
that pig industry workers had elevated odds of swine H1N2
and H3N2 Perth seropositivity which remained after con-
trolling for seropositivity to other measured, potentially
cross-reactive strains.
The increased risk of A(H1N1)pdm09 in pig industry
workers is compatible with the concurrent emergence of
infection with A(H1N1)pdm09 in pigs in England, which was
first observed in November 20096 and confirmed by the
serological results in our study. As there was minimal trade of
live pigs between North America and Europe during the
period of the study and no reports of the pandemic strain in
European pigs prior to human cases,37 it is likely that pigs were
initially infected by humans during the early stages of the 2009
pandemic, and infection then transmitted efficiently within
and between pig herds but also through reverse zoonoses
events following contact of pigs with infected humans.
Phylogenetic analysis has subsequently demonstrated that
H1N1pdm2009 has been repeatedly transmitted from humans
to swine since the pandemic.38 Pig industry workers na€ıve to A
(H1N1)pdm09 would be susceptible to zoonotic infection
from pig herds undergoing active infection, with exposure to,
sometimes large, groups of pigs simultaneously undergoing
acute infection and shedding virus favouring transmission
from pigs to pig industry workers. Further bidirectional
transmissionmay have led to an amplification effect leading to
high levels of infection in both pigs and pig industry workers.
This is important in that it shows that dense populations of
pigs can serve as an amplifying reservoir for influenza virus,
increasing the risk of novel virus transmission to both pigs and
to man. This has been illustrated during an outbreak of
H1N1pdm2009 on a research farm in Canada39 and explored
in mathematical models of the potential amplifying impact of
such bidirectional transmission.40
Our findings overall are consistent with other work
identifying increased risk of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in pig
industryworkers compared to otherswithout occupational pig
exposure. However, they could not exclude cross-reactivity
between other SIVs and influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 as the
cause;29,33 and others have reported no increased risk.30,41 We
found evidence of an increased risk of the A(H1N1)pdm09
strain which is known to affect both pigs and humans in pig
industry workers even after controlling for potential cross-
reactivity and the effect was also not due to confounding by
age, region, and time of sample or vaccination.
Fragaszy et al.
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Table 3. Seroprevalence of SIV infection among pigs on farms linked to one or more pig farmers
Farm
No.
pigs
tested
Classical swine H1N1 Swine H3N2 87 Swine avian-like H1N1 A(H1N1)pdm09
No.
positive
pigs
%
Positive
pigs
Farm
considered
positive*
No.
positive
pigs
%
Positive
pigs
Farm
considered
positive*
No.
positive
pigs
%
Positive
pigs
Farm
considered
positive*
No.
positive
pigs
%
Positive
pigs
Farm
considered
positive*
1 16 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 8 50 Yes
2 12 2 17 No 0 0 No 1 8 No 3 25 Yes
3 16 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 8 50 Yes
4 12 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 5 42 Yes
5 12 0 0 No 8 67 Yes 0 0 No 7 58 Yes
6 16 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 15 94 Yes
7 10 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No
8 16 0 0 No 1 6 No 2 13 No 4 25 Yes
9 12 2 17 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No
10 16 1 6 No 0 0 No 2 13 No 3 19 Yes
11 12 0 0 No 0 0 No 1 8 No 1 8 No
12 16 2 13 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 10 63 Yes
13 16 0 0 No 0 0 No 0 0 No 8 50 Yes
14 32 2 6 No 1 3 No 0 0 No 15 47 Yes
Total 214 9 4 0 of 14 10 5 1 of 14 6 3 0 of 14 87 41 11 of 14
*Farms were considered positive if three or more animals in that herd tested positive (titres ≥ 40 and highest titre within HA subtype).
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With regard to other SIV strains other than A(H1N1)
pdm09, previous studies found an increased risk of seropos-
itivity to at least one SIV in pig workers, including
H1N1,17,18,27,29,31,33,41–43 H1N218,28,31 and H3N228–30,44
strains. In our study, we found increased risk of seropositivity
both to swine H1N2 and H3N2 Perth. This increased risk
remained after controlling for potential cross-reactivity with
measured strains. The increased risk of seropositivity to swine
H1N2 is consistent with occupational exposure. The increased
risk of H3N2 Perth (a human strain) was not explained by
cross-reactivity to swineH3N2 87 or swineH1N2. Others have
found H3N2 Perth strain assays to cross-react strongly with
swine H3N2.45 Thus it is plausible that the increased risk of
H3N2 seropositivity in pig workers in our study was due to
cross-reactivity with an unmeasured H3N2 swine strain. This
is further supported by the fact that the association was only
found in those aged 30 years or more who would have been of
working age when H3N2 strains last circulated widely in UK
swine in 1997. A further unexpected finding was the high levels
of antibodies to swine H3N2 87 in the general population and
in pig workers. This could also be explained through cross-
reactivity with human H3N2 strains.
In contrast to all the previous studies which compared pig
workers to highly selective groups, our work has the
advantage of using a general population comparison group,
frequency-matched for age, region, month of bleed and
gender. Although we could not exclude pig exposure in the
control group such exposure is likely to be rare in the general
UK population. The work is challenged by limited ability of
laboratory tests to exclude cross-reactivity between all viral
strains, a common issue with studies of this nature. Future
work using microneutralisation assays would reduce uncer-
tainty over cross-reactivity.
It is generally considered that influenza virus reassortment
with significant pandemic potential is most likely to occur in
developing country ‘hotspots’46, where the demographic,
cultural and economic circumstances and animal husbandry
practices together result in settings of dense overlaps between
humans and animal populations and opportunities for cross-
species transmission. However, given our findings, and
observations of new reassortant strains elsewhere in Eur-
ope47,48, there should be no assumption that reassortment
with possible zoonotic risk could not also occur in indus-
trialised settings.
The study was unable to examine whether there was also
an increased risk of clinical disease in pig industry workers,
but the work suggests the need for coordinated enhanced
surveillance in both pigs and pig industry workers. Obser-
vations from this study also offer strong supporting
evidence that pig industry workers should be among the
occupational groups offered annual seasonal influenza
vaccination. Preventing influenza infection in people who
work with pigs would seem to be a logical option to
minimise the risk of transmission of human variants into
pigs, and by extension to reduce the possibilities for
reassortment in pigs.
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